Sarin and the Syrian Opposition

If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from the conclusion page.

Since it seems that over 500 kg of sarin were used in the attack, and the regime is known to have large amounts of sarin, this is circumstantial evidence supporting the regime attack theory. To evaluate its strength, we need to estimate the likelihood that the opposition could obtain sarin.

Direct Evidence Connecting the Opposition to Sarin 

Carla Del Ponte, a senior UN investigator who interviewed victims of previous attacks, shared her personal opinion that chemical attacks were initiated solely by the opposition. I usually ignore opinions brought without concrete evidence, but unlike other reports, this comes from a very reliable and relevant source. Given that the clarification the UN issued following her interview does not contradict her claims, this testimony may have some value.

Update: In a later interview (minute 4:17), she reiterates her assessment, and explains this is what the initial evidence indicates, but recommends waiting for the final report. (Found by Jim Dobbin).

In a chemical attack in Khan Al-Assal, whose victims were Syrian troops and regime-supporting civilians, a Russian investigation determined the use of sarin. While the report attempts to lay blame on the rebels, it does not share its evidence and is therefore difficult to evaluate. More here.

On June 2nd Syria reportedseizing 2 canisters of sarin. Additionally, on two occasions (Barzeh April 26th, Jobar August 24th) Syria reported a chemical attack on its troops, describing symptoms typical to sarin.

Since evidence was not presented, these reports are of no use.

On January 2^nd an FSA official claims to have chemical capabilities, but does not provide specifics.

This video also shows an activist claiming to have chemical weapons, but does not provide specific evidence.

This well-known video threatens Assad’s supporters with chemical weapons, and demonstrates their use on rabbits. The video uses the term “Reeh Sarsar” which is later mentioned in the Liwa Al Islam rocket launch videos. Assuming it is authentic, it would only demonstrate intent and not capabilities, since poisoning an animal in a small confined space is very different from an operational chemical weapon. Additionally, the chemicals shown are not directly related to sarin production.
Update: In a comment below Charles Wood showed this video most likely shows chlorine poisoning.

Another video shows two Liwa Al Islam operatives coordinating bombardment of a building. One of them says he will bring just one sarin (translation verified independently). It is heavily edited, and can easily be fabricated, but still worth noting.

Two days after the chemical attack in Ghouta, the Syrian TV broadcasted two phone calls, which were presumably intercepted by Syrian Intelligence. In the first a rebel reports to his Saudi sponsor that his group carried a chemical attack in Homs. In the second a transfer of sarin is coordinated.

They seem authentic but are not strong enough as evidence: The first does not include details about the attack, and may be an exaggeration to impress the sponsor, and the second can possibly be interpreted as sarin antidotes.

Evidence of Attempts to Acquire Sarin

The most important evidence for opposition involvement in acquiring sarin, is the arrest of 11 Al-Nusra operatives in Turkey in May 2013. They were initially reported to possess 2 kg of sarin, which was later claimed to be antifreeze. They were eventually charged with attempting to acquire chemicals for the production of sarin. Interestingly, the prosecution listed these chemicals, including:

• Thionyl Chloride (SOCl2)
• Potassium Fluoride (KF)
• Methanol (CH3OH)
• Isopropanol (C3H8O)
• Isopropanolamine (C3H9NO)
• White Phosphorus (P4)

Comparing this to the sarin production process (in the appendix here), shows this is unmistakably a sarin shopping-list. The initial downplay as ‘antifreeze’ probably referred to the Methanol, which is one type of antifreeze.

Interestingly, only one week later, Iraq arrested five Al Qaeda operatives that were planning to produce sarin for use in Iraq and abroad.

Complexity of Producing Sarin

Last, let's examine the difficulty of producing sarin in underground conditions.

In 2001 Scientific American in cooperation with Prof. JamesTour conducted two experiments in mail ordering chemicals needed to produce sarin. They successfully received the chemicals within days.

More recently, Tour gave an interview in which he estimated that a trained chemist with access to the raw materials and equipment can “produce sarin quite easily”.

Another way to examine the difficulty of underground sarin production is by examining the only case where this is known to happen: by the Aum Shinrikyocult in Japan (source1, source2, source3). The cult started producing sarin and other nerve agents after failing to produce a biological weapon. They made significant investments in lab equipment intended to produce 70 tons of sarin. In practice, technical problems and government investigations limited their total production to less than 100 kg over their year and a half of operation.

However, Syrian opposition groups may have some significant advantages over Aum Shinrikyo:

1. Much weaker government supervision. Treating the opposition as a non-state actor would be inaccurate, as they have full control of some areas of Syria, making them the de-facto state there. This is critical: Aum Shinrikyo had stopped their process several times and destroyed products because of police investigations. 
2. Possible access to former Chemical Warfare professionals from Iraq, Libya or Syria.
3. Access to lab technology that is 18 years more advanced. This was specifically addressed in this detailed analysis of Aum’s chemical program, which estimated that current lab equipment would make a similar effort much cheaper. Quotes:
   “Such an effort might be well disguised or established on a smaller scale, however, by taking advantage of the development over the last decade of powerful, low-cost micro-production chemical capabilities”.
   “… the chemical industry has, over the last decade, introduced modular and flexible designs where reactions may occur in a solvent-free environment, at increased concentrations and in much smaller and less expensive facilities”.
4. International allies. This could prove very helpful when trying to obtain regulated chemicals or lab equipment.
5. Internet access, which makes information on sarin production widely available (e.g. details of Aum Shinrikyo’s process). This can significantly accelerate production - Aum Shinrikyo scientists spent much of their time in trial and error.

This indicates that sarin is not a chemical that “anyone can make in their kitchen”, as is often claimed. However, an organization with sufficient funding and trained professionals can produce large quantities of sarin within several months.

Conclusions:

1. There is strong evidence that Syrian opposition groups have attempted to acquire sarin, and some weak evidence that they succeeded in doing so.
2. There is some weak evidence that Syrian opposition groups have carried out chemical attacks.
3. Production of sarin in the quantities used to attack Zamalka is within the reach of well-funded underground organizations.

Did I miss anything? Please share your evidence and analysis and help me improve my conclusions.