Brown Moses and HRW Reports

If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from the conclusion page.

After reviewing the evidence presented in the UN Report and US Government Assessment, and finding it to be of negligible value, I will now examine the evidence from Brown Moses' blog and the HRW report that relies on it.

Unlike the UN and US, who presented flawed evidence and low quality analysis, Brown Moses consistently provides high quality reports based on reliable evidence and a transparent process. As a side note, the fact that a blogger is a more trusted source than these organizations is yet another testament to the deep social transformations brought about by the Internet.

Brown Moses' conclusion is that "all credible evidence points to the Syrian military being responsible for the August 21st attack".

His conclusion is based on the following evidence (further detailed here):

1. The UN has linked the M14 and the UMLACA to the chemical attacks.
2. He has never seen either of these used by the Syrian opposition.
3. The opposition has reported being attacked by UMLACA since January 4th 2013.
4. The UMLACA was identified in a previous chemical attack in Adra on August 5th.
5. A video shows a launch of a rocket similar in design to the UMLACA by forces that seem to be from the Syrian Army.
6. Another video shows a launch of a rocket similar in design to the UMLACA from a government controlled area.
7. A Syrian Army vehicle with an Iranian Falaq-2 type launcher was photographed showing a tail of a rocket similar to the UMLACA.
8. One of the UMLACA found in Zamalka was launched from the north, the location of several Syrian military bases.
9. While the UMLACA is not a standard weapon but something manufactured locally, it is of high quality, which he estimates to be beyond the capabilities of the opposition.
10. There is no reliable evidence tying the opposition to chemical attacks.

Additionally, the HRW report also relies on the attack requiring sophistication and coordination beyond the reach of the opposition, specifically:

11. The attack involved two neighborhoods that are 16 km apart
12. It involved huge amounts of sarin (over 600 kg)
13. The rockets require special launchers

So now let's examine the

The UN has linked the M14 and the UMLACA to the chemical attacks.
As shown before, the evidence in the UN report actually shows that unlike the UMLACA, the M14 is not linked to chemical attacks. There are also some holes in the UN's association of the UMLACA with the chemical attack, but overall the evidence seems strong that the UMLACA was indeed the weapon.

He has never seen either of these used by the Syrian opposition.
Indeed there is no reliable evidence of an opposition UMLACA attack. However, the Syrian Army is not in the habit of uploading videos showing ammunition used against it. The only way we could know if rebels are using an UMLACA is if they choose to share this information.
Update: This new video shows opposition UMLACA launches.

The opposition has reported being attacked by UMLACA since January 4th 2013.
Previous reports are analyzed in detail here. Rebel controlled areas have been attacked by conventional and White Phosphorus UMLACAs several times. However, Zamalka is the first UMLACA chemical attack on a rebel area.

The UMLACA was identified in a previous chemical attack in Adra on August 5th.
According to this analysis, it seems there was no chemical attack and possibly even no UMLACA attack in Adra on August 5th.

A video shows a launch of a rocket similar in design to the UMLACA by forces that seem to be from the Syrian Army.
Indeed this video is a strong piece of evidence. The heavy equipment used, the uniforms and the reported location in Mezzeh airport clearly indicate this is a regime operation. The very unique design is nearly identical to the UMLACA, clearly implying they are from one source.
The rocket in the video is obviously much bigger than the others. I estimate it to be roughly 50% larger in all dimensions except for the warhead length which is maybe 100% longer. This would bring it to a total weight of over 500 kg.
The slow operation and the large number of people bring me to believe this is a test of a new version of the UMLACA.

Another video shows a launch of a rocket similar in design to the UMLACA from a government controlled area.
The rocket in this video does seem to be an UMLACA, but I haven't seen a reliable geolocation of the launch site. If anyone has such evidence, please share.
Update: After examining satellite images of the area, I confirm it does seem like Qadam Railway station.

A Syrian Army vehicle with an Iranian Falaq-2 type launcher was photographed showing a tail of a rocket similar to the UMLACA.
This photograph also seems to show Syrian Army personnel, and the tail is similar to the distinctive UMLACA tail. More important, the size of the rocket is the "normal" size.
However, the launcher is probably not a Falagh-2 as suggested, since the UMLACA's 360 mm warhead could not fit in it. Judging by its crude appearance, I believe that like the UMLACA, it is a new design unique to the conflict.
It is interesting to note that in both pictures the launcher is in a residential area, indicating that the Army does not view it as a secret weapon.
Update 2: This video from December 2012 clearly shows an UMLACA with a conventional warhead being launched from a Syrian Army location.
Update 3: Brown Moses has found several more videos of UMLACA launches associated with the Syrian Army.
Update 4: This Syrian Army promotional video found by user simla1 on Brown Moses also shows an UMLACA launch.
Update 5: Another video showing the Syrian Army with an UMLACA launcher (from Brown Moses).
Update 6: This video shows a launch by the Syrian Army from up close of the bigger version mentioned above.

One of the UMLACA found in Zamalka was launched from the north, the location of several Syrian military bases.
The northern source for the Zamalka attack is correct, and supported by more evidence here. However, the distance to the military bases in the north is about 8 km, while the UMLACA's range was calculated to be 2.5 km. This puts the launch location outside regime-held territory.

While the UMLACA is not a standard weapon but something manufactured locally, it is of high quality, which he estimates to be beyond the capabilities of the opposition.
The UMLACA's build quality is well below that of standard munitions, but it indeed seems to be above the quality of opposition-produced weapons. Determining whether this is true would require a much deeper analysis. In any case, there is enough evidence to show the UMLACA is a Syrian Army development.

There is no reliable evidence tying the opposition to chemical attacks.
This is of course opinion and not evidence. Evidence for a rebel attack is examined in later posts.

The attack involved two neighborhoods that are 16 km apart
This assumes that a chemical attack occurred in Moadamiyah, which this analysis shows is probably not the case. Even if so, the Moadamiyah attack was much smaller and occurred 2.5 hours later, so it would not in itself imply large scale coordination.

It involved huge amounts of sarin (over 600 kg)
The amount of sarin used in the attack is indeed large - much larger than the amounts used in the Tokyo sarin attack for example. However, as shown here, this amount is within the reach of several Syrian opposition organizations. Furthermore, the sarin was of poor quality indicating underground production.

The rockets require special launchers
While a launcher provides higher accuracy and safety, it is not required. The opposition was repeatedly shown to launch rockets using makeshift launchers. Furthermore, the assumption that the opposition does not have an UMLACA launcher (or any other weapon of the Syrian Army) is unfounded, as explained in detail here.

Summary:

1. The evidence implying a large-scale coordinated attack out of the capability of the opposition is weak. 
2. The geolocation of the attack source to military bases is very weak. Actually, a more careful analysis results in locations within rebel held territory.
3. The evidence associating the regime with the use of rockets similar to those used in the August 21st chemical attack is very strong.
4. Use of weaponry of the Syrian Army is very weak evidence of regime culpability, due to the frequent opposition raids on ammunition depots.

Conclusion: Brown Moses, with his munition analysis, is the only one to present reliable evidence on the chemical attack. However, it does not in itself indicate regime culpability, and the other evidence he presents was found to be weak.

Did I miss anything? Please share your evidence and analysis and help me improve my conclusions.