Summary of Conclusions

This page contained a collection of conclusions gathered during the investigation. Now that a final conclusion has been reached is is mostly obsolete. Read the final conclusion here.

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Seeing as the blog is getting very detailed and rapidly growing in traffic, I prepared a summary of the conclusions so far, so new readers can easily find their way around.

This blog is an online collaborative effort to find who was behind the Ghouta chemical attack.

Immediately following the event, numerous reports were published by governments and NGOs. Some blamed the regime and some the opposition, but somehow, they all reached the conclusion that matched their existing prejudices and interests.

Here you will find the most detailed analysis of all evidence available. It is built in a hierarchical structure that allows the reader to verify any step of a conclusion by following the links until reaching the hard evidence. There are no "we have information that shows", or "it is well known" or "a renown expert has determined". Only evidence, verifiable claims and logical conclusions.

It is still work in progress, but so far we reached several interesting conclusions:

1. The US Report presented no significant evidence to support the regime attack theory.
2. The UN Report has major flaws, such as wrong trajectory calculations, which were widely misinterpreted to imply regime culpability.
3. The blogger Brown Moses is the only one to present reliable evidence to support the regime attack theory, by proving the attackers used rockets developed and deployed by the Syrian Army.
4. Any munition of the Syrian Army should be assumed to also be available to the opposition.
5. The rockets used in the attack come in two versions: a conventional warhead and an incendiary warhead. There is no evidence that they were used as a chemical weapon prior to the attack.
6. The attackers could have used the incendiary warhead, and filled it instead with sarin. Since incendiary and chemical detonators are similar, this would have allowed them to bypass the technological difficulty of building an effective chemical warhead.
7. There is somewhat stronger evidence for past use of lethal chemical weapons by the opposition than by the regime.
8. The opposition has attempted to acquire sarin, but there is not enough evidence to determine whether they were successful.
9. The sarin used in the attack was of low quality, indicating it is more likely not from a military source.
10. The chemical attack was limited to the area of Zamalka, and the report of a chemical attack in Moadamiyah is probably incorrect.
11. The rockets used in the attack were likely shot from the north at a short range, an area which was not under regime control at the time (map).

Follow this page for updates as more findings come in.

Want to help improve the conclusions? Just comment with a clear argument based on reliable evidence.

Thank You!